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x.com/mikenov/status/2099908…Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) #Putin  #Schroeder  #Intelligence
Putin, Schroeder, and Russia-Germany Intelligence cooperation  – AI Mode

The relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder heavily influenced Russia-Germany intelligence cooperation, with ramifications that continue to impact European security today.
During Schröder’s chancellorship (1998–2005), Germany pursued a policy of “strategic partnership” with Russia. However, critics argue that this pursuit ultimately left Germany exceptionally vulnerable to Russian espionage. [1, 2]
🛠️ Strategic Blindness and Policy Shifts
A defining element of intelligence cooperation during this era was not what was shared, but what was actively dismantled:

The 2002 Counterintelligence Moratorium: In 2002, under the Schröder administration, Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), discontinued active investigation and infiltration of Russian intelligence operations. The decision was driven by a political directive to treat Russia as a trusted partner rather than a hostile threat, a move that security officials later widely condemned as a massive historical mistake. [2]
The Role of Frank-Walter Steinmeier: During this period, current German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier served as Schröder’s Chief of Staff and the official coordinator of Germany’s intelligence services. He was a central architect of the Wandel durch Handel (Change through Trade) policy, which prioritized deep economic intertwinement over systemic security vetting of Russian activities. [3, 4]

🤝 The Putin-Schröder Alliance and “Schröderization”
Putin, a former KGB agent who served in Dresden and spoke fluent German, leveraged his background to cultivate an unusually intimate, “gilded friendship” with Schröder. This dynamic profoundly impacted Germany’s political-security apparatus: [1, 5, 6]

Immediate Pivot to Russian State Energy: Within weeks of losing the 2005 election, Schröder accepted a lucrative position leading the Nord Stream AG shareholder committee—a project he had aggressively pushed through during his final days in office. This phenomenon of Moscow employing retired Western politicians to buy institutional influence and shield its operations became known globally as “Schröderization”. [3, 4, 7]
Intelligence Defenses Compromised: Intelligence analysts note that Russia effectively neutralized German institutional resistance not through brute cyber warfare or classic clandestine theft, but by capturing the loyalties of the nation’s political elite. Western intelligence officials, such as former CIA operatives, have pointed out that German agencies historically exhibited a culture of institutional denial and arrogance regarding Putin, actively avoiding inconvenient truths that could disrupt trade. [6, 8]

📉 Long-Term Consequences
The legacy of this intelligence approach has resulted in systemic vulnerabilities that Germany is still untangling:

Deep Penetration of German Security: The failure to monitor Russian activities in the early 2000s paved the way for massive contemporary espionage scandals. This includes the high-profile exposure of a senior BND director unmasked as a double agent spying for Moscow’s FSB. [2]
Withholding History: Schröder’s commitment to protecting his relationship with Putin remains steadfast. In late 2025, Schröder actively refused requests from the German Federal Archives to hand over formal records and transcripts of his official conversations with Putin from his time in power, choosing instead to hide 178 folders within a political foundation. [9]
Modern Diplomatic Isolation: Despite the ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Schröder continues to defend Putin and hold private meetings with him in Moscow. While Putin has floated Schröder as a preferred mediator for European security architecture, the European Union and German officials have roundly rejected the idea, citing his complete lack of neutrality and absolute political capture by the Kremlin. [10, 11, 12, 13]

[1]  facebook.com
[2]  spiegel.de
[3]  icds.ee
[4]  atlanticcouncil.org
[5]  aljazeera.com
[6]  engelsbergideas.com
[7]  rferl.org
[8]  euromaidanpress.com
[9]  unn.ua
[10]  reuters.com
[11]  globalbankingandfinance.com
[12]  theguardian.com
[13]  reuters.com
– Google Search  google.com/search?q=Putin%2C…—  https://x.com/mikenov/status/2099908785808495085

— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) Sep 15, 2026